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EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION-TITLE VII's LIMITED PRE-
EMPTIVE EFFECT ALLOWS STATE LAWS MANDATING PREGNANCY
LEAVE AND REINSTATEMENT. California Federal Savings and Loan
Association v. Guerra, 107 S. Ct. 683 (1987).
California Federal Savings and Loan Association (Cal Fed) per-
mitted employees with at least three months of service to take unpaid
leaves of absence for various reasons including pregnancy.' Cal Fed at-
tempted to reinstate employees returning from unpaid leave into the
employee's usual position or one similar, but Cal Fed expressly reserved
the right to terminate the employee if such positions were unavailable.
Having taken a pregnancy leave in January, 1982, Lillian Garland, a
Cal Fed receptionist for several years, notified Cal Fed of her ability to
return to work in April, 1982. Upon being informed that her job had
been filled and that no similar positions were available, Garland com-
plained to the California Department of Fair Employment and Hous-
ing, which issued an administrative accusation against Cal Fed on her
behalf. The accusation charged Cal Fed with violating section
12945(b)(2) of California's Fair Employment and Housing Act.2 That
provision grants employees the right to return to the same or similar
position if the maternity leave period does not exceed four months and
a business necessity does not require filling the position earlier.
Cal Fed sought a declaration from the United States District
Court for the Central District of California3 that section 12945(b)(2)
was inconsistent with and preempted by Title VII." In addition Cal Fed
sought an injunction against enforcement of the section. The district
court granted Cal Fed's motion for summary judgment, holding that
Title VII preempted the California statute. On appeal by the Califor-
nia Department of Fair Employment and Housing, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that Title VII
does not preempt a state law that guarantees pregnant women a certain
number of pregnancy leave days, such law being neither inconsistent
I. The term "pregnancy", as used throughout this note, includes pregnancy, childbirth, and
related medical conditions.
2. CAL. Gov'T. CODE § 12945(b)(2) (West 1980).
3. California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 562 (C.D.
Cal. 1984), rev/d, 758 F.2d 390 (9th Cir. 1985), afid, 107 S. Ct. 683 (1987).
4. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-716, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e and other scattered sections) [hereinafter Title VII].
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with, nor unlawful under, Title VII.8 The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari and affirmed the court of appeals' decision.
California Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Guerra, 107 S. Ct.
683 (1987).
Section 703(a)(1) of Title VII makes it an unlawful employment
practice for an employer to "discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin . ... -I The 1964 Civil Rights Act's opponents had added sex
as a prohibited basis of discrimination in the hopes of defeating the
act's passage. With the last minute addition of sex as a prohibited
basis of employment discrimination, only limited evidence of congres-
sional intent as to the meaning of sex discrimination exists. The Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)8 issued guidelines in
1972 stating that employment discrimination based on pregnancy vio-
lated Title VII's prohibition of sex discrimination.' Under those guide-
lines numerous courts found that employment policies and benefits with
differences based on pregnancy violated Title VII.' 0
In the 1970s, pregnant workers began bringing discrimination suits
alleging violations of their due process and equal protection rights."
Such claims required the workers to show that the employer had both a
nexus to the state 2 and a discriminatory purpose behind the challenged
5. California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 758 F.2d 390 (9th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 107 S.
Ct. 683 (1987).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1982).
7. 110 CONG. REc. 2577 (1964). On the bill's last day in the House Rules Committee, a
motion to add sex as a basis of discrimination in Title VII was defeated. 20 CONG. QUARTERLY
344 (1964). The day before the act's passage on the House floor, Representative Howard Smith of
Virginia proposed a sex discrimination amendment, which passed after two hours of discussion.
110 CONG. REc. 2577 (1964); 110 CONG. REC. 2720 (1964). In the Senate, sex discrimination
received little discussion. Miller, Sex Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. 51 MINN. L. REV. 877, 879-83 (1967).
8. Title VII is subtitled "Equal Employment Opportunities," and the federal enforcement
agency is named the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
4(a) (1982).
9. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10 (1973). The EEOC guidelines declared that pregnancy constitutes a
temporary disability for all job-related purposes. Hence, the EEOC guidelines required that preg-
nancy be treated the same as other temporary disabilities. Id.
10. E.g., Communications Workers of America v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 513 F.2d 1024,
1030 (2d Cir. 1975), vacated & remanded, 429 U.S. 1033 (1977); Satty v. Nashville Gasoline
Co., 522 F.2d 850, 854 (6th Cir. 1975), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 434 U.S. 136 (1977);
Holthaus v. Compton & Sons, Inc., 514 F.2d 651, 653 (8th Cir. 1975).
II. See Wald, Judicial Construction of the 1978 Pregnancy Discrimination Amendment to
Title VII: Ignoring Congressional Intent. 31 AM. U. L. REV. 591, 592-96 (1982).
12. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (fourteenth amendment does not prohibit
[Vol. 9:669
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action. 13 In Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur," decided in
1974, a pregnant worker successfully claimed that a school board's rule
requiring a pregnant teacher to take at least eight months of unpaid
leave, five months before delivery and three months after, violated an
employee's due process rights. The Court reasoned that the school
board's rule with arbitrary cut-off dates bore "no rational relationship
to the valid state interest of preserving continuity of instruction. 15 The
Court found that the cut-off dates amounted to a conclusive presump-
tion that every pregnant teacher is physically incapable of teaching be-
yond the fifth or sixth month of pregnancy.16 The Court noted that the
Constitution requires individual determinations of pregnant employees'
abilities to continue working. 7
In Geduldig v. Aiello,'5 decided six months after LaFleur, the
United States Supreme Court held that California's employee disability
insurance plan, funded entirely from employee contributions, could ex-
clude payments for normal pregnancy-related disabilities. The
Geduldig decision rested upon the fourteenth amendment's equal pro-
tection clause rather than Title VII. 9 In the majority opinion, however,
a footnote stated that classifications based on pregnancy are not neces-
sarily sex-based classifications.2 Several inferior courts subsequently
held Geduldig inapplicable to pregnancy discrimination actions arising
private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful; state action is required).
13. See Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (purposeful discrimination
is the condition offensive to the Constitution).
14. 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
15. Id. at 643.
16. Id. at 644. Since Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975), the irrebutable presumption
doctrine has not been used by the Supreme Court.
17. 414 U.S. at 645-46.
18. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
19. Id. The majority considered the exclusion an "under-inclusive" classification, which re-
quires only a "rational relation test." An under-inclusive classification contains all similarly situ-
ated people but excludes some people who are similar to them in terms of the law's purpose. J.
NOWAK. R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 588 (2d ed. 1983). The "rational
relation" test is the Court's lowest level of scrutiny in its equal protection analysis, and requires
only that the legislative classification bear a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental
interest. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). The level of scrutiny for gender-based
classifications is that the state must show a close and substantial relationship to important govern-
mental objectives. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). The
strictest scrutiny level invalidates inherently suspect classifications, such as race, national origin
and alienage, unless the state shows the class is necessary to further a compelling state interest. In
re Grifliths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
20. 417 U.S. at 496 n.20. The footnote explained that distinctions based on pregnancy may
not invidiously discriminate on the basis of sex, because classifications of the pregnant and non-
pregnant include only women in the former but both sexes in the latter. Id.
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under Title VII.21
Two years later the United States Supreme Court, in General
Electric Co. v. Gilbert,22 held that Geduldig did apply to actions
brought under Title VII,2" and that under Title VII employers could
exclude pregnancy from comprehensive disability plans. General Elec-
tric's disability plan paid nonoccupational sickness and accident bene-
fits, but excluded pregnancy disabilities from coverage. A class action
on behalf of female employees sought a declaration that the exclusion
violated Title VII. 24 The Court in Gilbert applied a disparate impact
analysis28 in holding that, absent evidence that the exclusion was a pre-
text for gender-based discrimination, disability plans excluding preg-
21. E.g., Satty v. Nashville Gas Co., 522 F.2d 850, 853-54 (6th Cir. 1975) (Geduldig not a
talisman for Title VII actions), afd in part, vacated in part, 434 U.S. 136 (1977); Gilbert v.
General Elec. Co., 519 F.2d 661, 666-67 (4th Cir. 1975) (Geduldig inapplicable to Title VII
actions), rev'd and remanded, 429 U.S. 125 (1976); Hutchison v. Lake Oswego School Dist. No.
7, 519 F.2d 961, 964 (9th Cir. 1975) (Title VII language was conducive to interpretations differ-
ent from those based upon the equal protection clause), vacated and remanded, 429 U.S. 1033
(1977); Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F.2d 1089, 1098-99 (5th Cir. 1975) (constitutionality of Georgia
bar exam not measurable by Title VII standards); Communications Workers of America v. Amer-
ican Tel. & Tel. Co., 513 F.2d 1024, 1030-31 (2d Cir. 1975) (statutory construction rather than
constitutional analysis is at issue), vacated and remanded, 429 U.S. 1033 (1977); Wetzel v. Lib-
erty Mutual Ins. Co., 511 F.2d 199, 203-04 (3d Cir. 1975) (actions under Title VII require statu-
tory interpretation rather than constitutional analysis), vacated and remanded, 424 U.S. 737
(1976). See also B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 384 (2d ed.
1983).
22. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
23. Id. at 136. LaFleur and Geduldig, resting on constitutional grounds, provided no protec-
tion to private sector pregnant workers since the requisite state action was lacking. Title VII
contains no state action requirement and provides a cause of action without a showing of discrimi-
natory intent. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
24. 429 U.S. at 128. The United States Supreme Court reversed both the district court and
court of appeals decisions, which held that General Electric's disability plan excluding pregnancy
benefits violated Title VII. See Gilbert v. General Electric Co., 375 F. Supp. 367 (E.D. Va. 1974),
afftd, 519 F.2d 661 (4th Cit. 1975).
25. Disparate impact analysis applies when a facially neutral employment policy has a dis-
proportionate impact on Title V II's protected groups. The affirmative defense of business necessity
counters the prima facie disparate impact case. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424
(1971). In contrast, facial discrimination, in which the policy explicitly discriminates, is countered
only by a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ). Only when the employer can show that
the excluded class is unable to perform essential job duties is the BFOQ defense available. Courts
can also apply a pretext theory when an employee alleges that a facially neutral policy is a mere
pretext for discrimination. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). An employer
may articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason to rebut an employee's prima facie case of
discrimination, shifting the burden to the employee to show that the employer's nondiscriminatory
reason is a pretext for discrimination. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248
(1981). Both facial discrimination and pretext cases are called "disparate treatment" cases. See
Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543, 1547 (11 th Cir. 1984) (citing Williams, Firing
the Woman to Protect the Fetus: The Reconciliation of Fetal Protection With Employment Op-
portunity Goals Under Title VII, 69 GEO. L.J. 641, 673-82 (1981)).
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nancy from coverage did not constitute gender-based discrimination.2
The Court recognized that a prima facie violation of Title VII occurs
"upon proof that the effect of an otherwise facially neutral plan or clas-
sification is to discriminate against members of one class or another.127
Finding that the women had failed to show the requisite gender-based
effects, the Court characterized the plan as merely "an insurance pack-
age, which covers some risks, but excludes others ... ." The Court
stressed that differentiating between the pregnant and the nonpregnant
was not sex discrimination, because the nonpregnant category includes
both men and women. 9 Therefore, no violation of Title VII occurred
under the Court's disparate impact analysis. The Gilbert majority also
discounted the EEOC Guidelines in its decision, since they were not a
contemporanous interpretation of Title VIP0 and conflicted with prior
EEOC rulings.31
One year after Gilbert, the Supreme Court held that a policy of
denying accumulated seniority to female employees returning from
pregnancy leave violates Title VII. 3' In Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty3
the Court distinguished forfeiture of seniority from the practice of ex-
cluding pregnancy from disability plans. 4 In the absence of evidence of
the exclusion's discriminatory effect, the Satty court held that the fail-
ure to include pregnancy in a disability plan was merely a failure to
extend to women a benefit that men could not and did not receive. 5
26. 429 U.S. at 136. The dissenting justices strongly opposed applying Geduldig to Gilbert's
Title VII issue. (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall, J.; Stevens, J.). Most courts since
Gilbert have found that a pregnancy classification does not constitute a pretext to discrimination
against women. B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 384 n. 119 (2d
ed. 1983) (citing Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 633 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1980); Condit v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 631 F.2d 1136 (4th Cir. 1980); and In re National Airlines, Inc., 434 F.
Supp. 249 (S.D. Fla. 1977)).
27. 429 U.S. at 137.
28. Id. at 138.
29. Id. at 133-40.
30. Id. at 135-36, 141-42. Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, found the guidelines,
.a particularly conscientious and reasonable product of EEOC deliberations," thus warranting
great deference. Id. at 157 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall, J.).
31. Id. at 140-45.
32. Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977). At issue was a company policy requir-
ing pregnancy leave, but filling open positions and placing returning employees in temporary posi-
tions. Even if the employee regained a permanent position, her seniority was lost except for pen-
sion and vacation purposes. The Court found this policy facially neutral. Id. at 140.
33. 434 U.S. 136 (1977).
34. The Court explained that Title VII does not "permit an employer to burden female em-
ployees in such a way as to deprive them of employment opportunities because of their different
role." Id. at 142 (citations omitted).
35. Id. at 144-45. The Court reiterated that a facially neutral plan, suffering from underin-
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The Court reasoned, however, that in cases where seniority was for-
feited, women were not simply denied a benefit, but were burdened in a
manner from which men were immune.36 Other inferior court decisions
since Satty have applied this benefit/burden analysis."
Responding to the Supreme Court's decisions,"8 Congress passed
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA),3 ' which amended
Title VII to include pregnancy classifications within the definition of
sex discrimination.40 The legislators specifically endorsed the opinions
of the dissenting justices in Gilbert"1 who had argued that the underin-
clusive disability programs differentiated not between the pregnant and
the nonpregnant, but between those who faced the risk of pregnancy
and those who did not.'2 Senator Williams, a PDA co-author, stated
that the Gilbert majority "ignored the congressional intent in enacting
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act-that intent was to protect all indi-
clusiveness, puts upon the plaintiff the burden of proving discrimination on the basis of sex in
violation of Title VII. Id. Recognizing that such a burden is met by proof of discriminatory effect,
the Court declined to decide whether intent must be proven to establish a Title VII violation. Id.
36. Id. at 142. In so holding the Court relied upon the 1972 EEOC guidelines previously
discounted in Gilbert, saying that the guideline applicable to seniority was enacted more contem-
poraneously with the Act and conflicted less with prior EEOC rulings than did the guidelines
considered in Gilbert. Id.
37. E.g., Mitchell v. Board of Trustees, 599 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
965 (1979).
38. H.R. REP. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CoDE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS 4749, 4751-52.
39. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, § I, 92 Stat. 2076 (1977) (codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982)) [hereinafter PDA].
40. The PDA provides:
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are not limited to,
because of or on the basis of pregnancy . . . and women affected by pregnancy . . .
shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of ben-
efits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their
ability or inability to work, and nothing in section 2000e2(h) of this title shall be inter-
preted to permit otherwise.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982). An employer maintaining a policy that adversely impacts on or
disparately treats pregnant employees violates Title VII unless a business necessity or bona fide
occupational qualification can be established. SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 10, at 388-89
(citing Harriss v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 649 F.2d 670, 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 947 (9th Cir. 1980)); see supra note 24.
41. S. REP. No. 331, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977); H.R. REP. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 4749, 4750. See General Elec. Co.
v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). "A realistic understanding of conditions found in today's labor
environment warrants taking pregnancy into account in fashioning disability policies." 429 U.S. at
159 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
42. House REPORT, supra note 37, at 2, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws at 4752; Discrimination on the Basis of Pregnancy, 1977: Hearings on S. 995 Before the
Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Human Resources, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. I passim
(1977).
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viduals from unjust employment discrimination, including pregnant
workers.""' A House committee report on the PDA stated that the Gil-
bert majority opinion "erode[s] our national policy of nondiscrimina-
tion in employment . . . [The PDA] unmistakably reaffirms that sex
discrimination includes discrimination based on pregnancy .... ,,44
With the passage of the PDA, the EEOC adopted new guidelines in
1979 nearly identical to the earlier ones.4 5
The PDA itself provides no substantive rules to govern pregnancy
discrimination claims. Inserted in Title VII's definitional provisions, the
PDA finds substantive form through the sections enumerating the pro-
scribed employment practices under the title."' The PDA confirms that
pregnant women are entitled to the same disability benefits as men;
however, under the PDA, employers not providing temporary disability
benefits to any workers do not have to begin providing disability bene-
fits to pregnant workers.47 The PDA lacked retroactive effect, so cases
arising before the amendment must still be analyzed under the Gil-
bert"8 and Satty4" benefit and burden analysis.50
In the 1983 case of Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co.
43. 123 CONG. REC. 7539 (1977) (statement of Sen. Williams introducing the bill), reprinted
in STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND HUMAN RESOURCES, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS., LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY OF THE PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT OF 1978 2 (1979).
44. H.R. REP. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 4749.
45. Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604 (1986). The EEOC
guidelines on employment policies relating to pregnancy and childbirth, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10
(1986), provide in part that a prima facie violation of Title VII occurs when a written or unwrit-
ten employment policy or practice excludes applicants because of pregnancy. Furthermore, preg-
nancy must be treated the same as disabilities caused by any other medical condition under an
employer's health or disability insurance or sick leave plans. Other employment practices involving
leave duration, seniority, and reinstatement must apply to pregnancy on the same terms as applied
to other disabilities. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(c) (1986) provides that a violation of the act occurs
when under an employment policy a pregnant worker is terminated and such termination dispa-
rately impacts on one sex and no business justification exists. All fringe benefit programs imple-
mented after October 31, 1978 must treat pregnancy the same as other disabilities.
46. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(l) & (2) (1982).
47. See. e.g., HOUSE REPORT. supra note 37, at 4, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 4749.
48. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
49. 434 U.S. 136 (1977).
50. E.g., Allen v. County of Montgomery, Ala., 788 F.2d 1485 (11th Cir. 1986); Zuniga v.
Kleberg County Hosp., 692 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1982); Langley v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.,
644 F.2d 1124 (5th Cir. 1981). Some inferior courts have used the PDA, contrary to its legislative
intent, to reach pre-Gilbert conclusions regarding the legality of practices relating to pregnancy.
See. e.g., Somers v. Aldine Independent School Dist., 464 F. Supp. 900 (S.D. Tex. 1979), aff'd
mem., 620 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1980).
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v. EEOC, 51 the Supreme Court held that the PDA provides protection
not only for women employees but also for the spouses of male employ-
ees. Rejecting the employer's contention that the PDA protects only
employees and not spouses of employees, 52 the Court reasoned that an
employer's health benefit plan which provides more extensive preg-
nancy coverage to female employees than to male employees' spouses
violates Title VII.53 Such plans give married male employees a benefit
package for their dependents that is less inclusive than the dependency
coverage provided to married female employees.
In 1987, California Federal Savings and Loan Association v.
Guerra,4 presented the United States Supreme Court with the issue of
whether Title VII, as amended by the PDA, preempts"5 a California
statute" that requires employers to provide leave and reinstatement to
51. 462 U.S. 669 (1983).
52. Several federal courts had held that the PDA applied only to women employees, not
employees' spouses; e.g., EEOC v. Joslyn Mfg. & Supply Co., 524 F. Supp. 1141 (N.D. Ill. 1981),
affd, 706 F.2d 1469 (7th Cir. 1983).
53. 462 U.S. at 676. See generally Note, Equality in the Workplace: Is That Enough for
Pregnant Workers?, 23 J. FAM. L. 401 (1984).
54. 107 S. Ct. 683 (1987).
55. The preemption doctrine derives from the supremacy clause of the United States Consti-
tution. U. S. Co NsT. art. VI, sec. 2. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). Preemp-
tion occurs when a state law obstructs "the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress." Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). When the state law oper-
ates within the state's traditional police power, the federal law preempts the state law only if
Congress's clear and manifest purpose to do so appears. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S.
218, 230 (1947); Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956). Both the state and federal regula-
tions must be interpreted so as to accomplish their purposes. United Steelworkers of America v.
Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201-02 (1979); Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977) (stating
that preemption analysis demands an examination of the regulations as they are interpreted and
applied, not merely as they are written). See also Note, Preemption as a Preferential Ground: A
New Canon of Construction, 12 STAN. L. REV. 208 (1959) (discussing how decisions based on
preemption allow the court to avoid reaching troublesome constitutional questions).
56. CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 12945(b)(2) (West 1980). California maintains a comprehensive
statute prohibiting employment and housing discrimination, the California Fair Employment and
Housing Act (FEHA), CAL. GOV'T. CODE §§ 12900-12996 (West 1980). The section at issue in
Guerra makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer to not provide reasonable
pregnancy leave to pregnant workers, unless the employer's refusal is based upon a bona fide
occupational qualification. The reasonable leave period, not exceeding four months, covers only the
period of actual disability caused by pregnancy. CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 12945(b)(2) (West 1980).
Only subsection (b)(2) applies to employers subject to Title VII, that is, employers of fifteen or
more employees must comply with both laws. CAL. Gov'T. CODE § 12945(e) (West 1980). The
California agency authorized to interpret the FEHA, the Fair Employment and Housing Commis-
sion, CAL. GOV'T. CODE §§ 12935(a)(1) and (h), construes § 12945(b)(2) as requiring California
employers to reinstate an employee returning from such pregnancy leave to the position she previ-
ously held, unless the position is no longer available due to business necessity. If business necessity
forecloses the position's availability, the employer must make a reasonable, good faith effort to
place the employee in a substantially similar position. Matter of the Accusation of the Dept. of
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pregnant employees. The Court began its analysis by stating that the
determination of whether a federal law preempts a state statute in-
volves solely the ascertainment of congressional intent. 7 The Court
stated that federal law may preempt state law in three ways: 6 (1) Con-
gress may expressly preempt state law; 5 (2) Congress may impliedly
preempt state laws where the sufficiently comprehensive scheme of fed-
eral regulation leaves no room for supplementary state regulation (oc-
cupy the field);6" and (3) an actual conflict with the federal law
preempts the state law.61
The Court found that only the third preemptive ground was at
issue in Guerra, as Congress had in two sections of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act expressly disclaimed any intent to preempt state laws on, or
occupy the field of, employment discrimination."2 Rather, Congress had
indicated that the Act preempts only those state laws which either re-
quire or permit employers to violate Title VII or are inconsistent with
the Act's purpose.63 The Court stated that these sections, severely lim-
iting Title VII's preemptive effect,64 reflect the importance Congress
attached to state antidiscrimination laws in achieving Title VII's goal
Fair Employment and Housing v. Travel Express, Case No. FEP80-81 A7-0992s N18709 83-17
(Aug. 4, 1983). See Guerra. 107 S. Ct. at 686-87 nn.l-4 and accompanying text.
57. 107 S. Ct. at 689 (citing Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 95 (1983) and
Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 (1978)).
58. 107 S. Ct. at 689. See generally Hirsch, Toward a New View of Federal Preemption,
1972 U. ILL. L.F. 515 (1972); Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federal-
ism and the Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 623 (1975).
59. 107 S. Ct. at 689 (citing Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977)).
60. 107 S. Ct. at 689 (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
61. 107 S. Ct. at 689. See generally P. HAY & R. ROTUNDA, THE UNITED STATES FEDERAL
SYSTEM: LEGAL INTEGRATION IN THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE. 117-23 (1982).
62. 107 S. Ct. at 689.
63. Id. at 689-90. Section 708 of Title VII provides that nothing in Title VII exempts any
person from compliance with or liability from any state laws "other than any such law which
purports to require or permit the doing of any act which would be an unlawful employment prac-
tice under this subchapter." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (1982). The Court primarily refers to section
708 in determining the preemptive effect of Title VII. See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S.
85, 101, 103 (1983); Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 423 n.18 (1975). Section
1104 of Title XI, applicable to all titles of the Civil Rights Act, provides in part that nothing in
the Act should be interpreted as a congressional intent to occupy the field of employment discrimi-
nation, "nor shall any provision of this Act be construed as invalidating any provision of State law
unless such provision is inconsistent with any of the purposes of this Act or any provision thereof."
42 U.S.C. § 2000h-4 (1982).
64. After discussing section 708 of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7, the Court in Shaw v.
Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 103 (1983), stated, "Title VII does not itself prevent states from
extending their nondiscrimination laws to areas not covered by Title VII . . . . Quite simply, Title
VII is neutral on the subject of all employment practices it does not prohibit." (Citations omitted).
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of equal employment opportunity."
In order to make the determination of whether California's statute
requires or permits employers to violate Title VII or is inconsistent with
the purposes of Title VII and the PDA, the Court turned to the issue of
"whether the PDA prohibits the States from requiring employers to
provide reinstatement to pregnant workers, regardless of their policy
for disabled workers generally.""' Cal Fed argued that the PDA's sec-
ond clause, which provides that "women affected by pregnancy .. .
shall be treated the same for all employment related purposes" prohib-
its employers from treating pregnant employees differently than other
disabled employees. 7 Examining the legislative history" and historical
context of the PDA, the Court noted that the PDA's enactment
stemmed from congressional reaction to Gilbert." Rather than impos-
ing a limitation on the PDA's remedial purpose, the Court believed
that the PDA's second clause was intended to overrule the Gilbert
holding and to illustrate how pregnancy discrimination is to be reme-
died.7 0 The Court noted that Congress had reviewed extensive evidence
of pregnancy discrimination,7 ' but the preferential treatment of preg-
nancy had received minimal discussion. The Court reasoned that "if
Congress had intended to prohibit preferential treatment, it would have
been the height of understatement to say only that the legislation
would not require such conduct." 72 The Court added that "[iut is
hardly conceivable that Congress would have extensively discussed only
its intent not to require preferential treatment if in fact it had intended
to prohibit such treatment.""
Cal Fed argued that even if section 12945(b)(2) does not require
the preferential treatment of pregnancy, it permits such treatment by
not specifically prohibiting preferential treatment. The Court responded
that only state laws sanctioning practices unlawful under Title VII,
rather than state laws which are merely silent on the practice, are pre-
65. Guerra, 107 S. Ct. at 690 (citing Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 101-02
(1983); Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 468-69, 472, 477 (1982); and New
York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 63-65 (1980)).
66. 107 S. Ct. at 691.
67. Id.
68. See, e.g., 124 CONG. REC. 29,642 (1977) (Remarks of Sen. Bayh, a PDA co-sponsor).
69. 107 S. Ct. at 691.
70. Id. at 691. See generally Note, Sexual Equality Under the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 690 (1983) and Note, Employment Equality Under the Pregnancy Dis-
crimination Act of 1978, 94 YALE L. J. 929 (1985).
71. 107 S. Ct. at 692.
72. Id. at 692-93.
73. Id. at 693.
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empted. 74 The Court found it significant that Congress knew of state
laws similar to California's and apparently found them consistent with
the PDA."' Hence, the Court found that Congress had failed to evince
the requisite "clear and manifest purpose" to preempt those state
laws.76
The Court also found that the PDA and the California statute
share a common goal-equal employment opportunities.7 By requiring
employers to reinstate women after a reasonable pregnancy leave, the
California statute simply ensured that women would not lose their jobs
because of pregnancy. 8 Concluding that Title VII, as amended by the
PDA, does not preempt the California law,79 the Court emphasized the
limited nature of the benefits the California statute provides: the stat-
ute covers only actual physical disability periods caused by preg-
nancy. 0 By contrast, a statute based on archaic or stereotypical as-
sumptions about pregnancy and the abilities of pregnant workers would
be inconsistent with Title VII's goal of equal employment
opportunity. 8'
The Court buttressed its reasoning by stating that "[slection
12945(b)(2) does not compel California employers to treat pregnant
workers better than other disabled employees; it merely establishes ben-
efits that employers must, at a minimum, provide to pregnant work-
ers."8  The Court asserted that "[e]mployers are free to give compara-
ble benefits to other disabled employees, thereby treating 'women
affected by pregnancy' no better than 'other persons not so affected but
similar in their ability or inability to work.' "83 Since compliance with
74. Id. at 694 n.29.
75. Id. at 693 n.23 and accompanying text.
76. Id. at 693 (citing Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation and
Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 206 (1983)). See also Miller-Wohl Co. v. Commissioner of Labor
and Indus. of Mont., 515 F. Supp. 1264 (D. Mont. 1981), rev'd, 685 F.2d 1088 (9th Cir. 1982).
77. 107 S. Ct. at 693-94. The seminal decision addressing Title VIi's equal employment
opportunity goal is Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-431 (1971). See also Hishon v.
King & Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69, 75 n.7 (1984); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747,
763 (1976). As to the California law, see Price v. Civil Service Comm'n, 26 Cal. 3d 257, 604 P.2d
1365 (1980) and American National Ins. Co. v. Fair Employment & Housing Comm'n, 32 Cal.
3d 603, 651 P.2d 1151 (1982).
78. 107 S. Ct. at 694.
79. Id. at 695.
80. CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 12945(b)(2) (West 1980).
81. 107 S. Ct. at 694. Cf. Wildman, The Legitimation of Sex Discrimination: A Critical
Response to Supreme Court Jurisprudence. 63 OR. L. REV. 265 (1984) (suggesting that the Court
itself engages in sexual stereotyping).
82. 107 S. Ct. at 695.
83. Id.
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California's statute and with the PDA's mandate that pregnant and
nonpregnant workers be treated alike is possible, no conflict exists be-
tween the California statute and the PDA. 4
Justice Stevens, concurring in the Guerra judgment, relied upon
Steelworkers v. Weber,8s which drew a distinction between discrimina-
tion against members of a protected class and preferential treatment of
class members, in finding that "the PDA's posture as part of Title VII
compels rejection of [the] argument that the PDA mandates complete
neutrality and forbids all beneficial treatment of pregnancy. 86 Justice
Scalia also concurred in the judgment, stating that Title VII's "an-
tipreemption" provision"7 controlled. 88 Justice White's dissent, joined
by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Powell, stated that the PDA's
second clause "leaves no room for preferential treatment of pregnant
workers." 9
Guerra's significance rests on the future development of pregnancy
antidiscrimination laws at the state level, not in the Court's preemption
analysis, since the decision applied the standard preemption doctrine.
Holding that Title VII does not preempt statutory schemes like Cali-
fornia's,9" the case may serve as a stepping stone to more state preg-
nancy antidiscrimination laws. In the United States, four states now
provide pregnant workers with more protections than those generally
afforded to other workers.91 As noted previously, California makes it
84. Id.
85. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
86. 107 S. Ct. at 695-96 (Stevens, J., concurring).
87. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (1983) (Title Vii's § 708).
88. 107 S. Ct. at 697 (Scalia, J., concurring).
89. Id. at 698 (White, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Powell, J.).
90. CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 12945(b)(2) (West 1980).
91. CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 12945(b)(2) (West 1980); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-60(a)(7)
(West 1986); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 149, § 105D (West 1986 & Supp. 1987); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 49-2-310 (1985). Four states, likewise, interpret their laws as requiring employers to grant
reasonable pregnancy disability leaves. Hawaii Sex Discrimination Rules § 12-23-58; Ill. Commis-
sion Guidelines § 2.10, 56 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 5210.110; N.H. Sex Discrimination Guidelines,
HUM 402.03; Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n Rules § 4112-5-05(G)(2); Wash. Sex Discrimination
Regulations, W.A.C. 162-30-020(5). Seven other states interpret their state laws as prohibiting
inadequate leave policies that have a disparate impact on the basis of sex. Colo. Sex Discrimina-
tion Rules, Rule 80.8(c), reprinted in 8A FAIR EMP. PRAC. MAN. (BNA) 453:1128; Iowa Commis-
sion Rules, Rule 3.10, reprinted in 8A FAIR EMP. PRAC. MAN. (BNA) 453:3098; Kan. Commis-
sion Rules and Procedure, § 2132-6(c), reprinted in 8A FAIR EMP. PRAC. MAN. (BNA) 453-3311;
Me. Commission Employment Regulations, § 3.06(F), reprinted in 8A FAIR EMP. PRAC. MAN.
(BNA) 455:530; Mo. Code of State Regulation, Title 4, Div. 180, ch. 3 § 16(B), reprinted in 8A
FAIR EMP. PRAC. MAN. (BNA) 455:1712; Okla. Commission Guidelines, V(l)(3), reprinted in 8A
FAIR EMp. PRAC. MAN. (BNA) 457:555; and R.I. Sex Discrimination Guidelines, 7(b), reprinted
in 8A FAIR EMP. PRAC. MAN. (BNA) 457:1276-77.
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unlawful for employers to refuse reasonable leaves for pregnant em-
ployees, provided the leave does not exceed four months.9 Connecticut
makes it unlawful for an employer to terminate employment, refuse
reasonable leave, and fail to reinstate employees because of preg-
nancy."3 Massachusetts provides, by statute, that for a period not ex-
ceeding eight weeks, a woman may take a maternity leave and then
return to her position with the same status, pay, tenure, and seniority."
Montana makes it unlawful for an employer to terminate a woman's
employment because of her pregnancy or to refuse to grant a woman a
reasonable maternity leave."5
The enactment by more states of such pregnancy antidiscrimina-
tion laws would further align the United States with the rest of the
Western industrialized nations on the issue of pregnancy discrimina-
tion.96 No drastic nor immediate additional measures will occur, but
the removal of preemption by Title VII as an obstacle makes more
state pregnancy antidiscrimination laws possible.
Mary L. Wiseman
92. CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 12945(b)(2) (West 1980).
93. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-60(a)(7) (West 1986).
94. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 105D (West 1986 & Supp. 1987).
95. MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-310 (1985).
96. Seventy-five countries, including all industrialized countries except the United States, re-
quire some form of maternity leave or parental benefit by statute. Note, Equality in the Work-
place: Is That Enough for Pregnant Workers?, 23 J. FAM. L. 401 (1984); S. KAMERMAN. A. KAHN
& P. KINGSTON. MATERNITY POLICIES AND WORKING WOMEN 15 (1983). These foreign countries
provide a minimum paid leave of twelve weeks with job security, pensions, and seniority all pro-
tected. Id. See Little, Mother Load or Overload: The Need for a National Maternity Policy, 17
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 717 (1985).
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